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HARLOW V. FITZGERALD: THE LOWER COURTS
IMPLEMENT THE NEW STANDARD FOR QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 1983
INTRODUCTION
Section 1983,1 enacted in 1871 as part of the Ku Klux Act,' pro-
vides a right of action for parties deprived of their constitutional or
federal statutory rights3 by actions taken "under color of" state law.4
Section 1983 thus holds public officials who violate an individual's
rights under the fourteenth amendment liable for that violation.
A suit brought under section 1983 may have any of three substan-
tive effects.5 One intended effect of the statute is to deter public officials
from violating constitutional rights; another is to provide compensation
to injured citizens when such deterrence has failed.6 In addition, the
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in. an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be con-
sidered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
• The Ku Klux Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (Supp. V 1981)). The Act was passed, along with other legislation, in reaction
to violence fostered by the Ku Klux Klan. Although its most immediate concern was
thus focused upon activities such as those of the Klan, the Act was intended to serve as
a remedy for any violation of rights secured by the fourteenth amendment. See Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-83 (1961); see also S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTs & CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION 3-4 (1979).
3 While there is some debate about what laws are included under section 1983's
right of action, the Supreme Court has construed the "and laws" phrase of section 1983
to mean that the statute "broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as
constitutional law." Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
' The "under color of" requirement is fulfilled by actions authorized by state
laws, by the uneven application of state laws, and by abuses of power "made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941) (Stone, J.)).
I Section 1983 does not itself create any substantive rights; rather, it creates a
right of action to vindicate substantive rights guaranteed by the Constitution or federal
statute. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S- 137, 144 n.3 (1979).
6 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-57 (1978) (section 1983 provides dam-
ages to compensate persons for injuries caused by deprivations of constitutional rights;
the statute-and damages awards-also embrace the purpose of deterring deprivations
of constitutional rights); see also S. NAHMOD, supra note 2 (section 1983 is designed to
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statute has had the very significant effect-probably unintended by the
drafters of the act-of serving as a mechanism for the expansion and
development of federal constitutional rights.
7
The substantive significance of the statute is magnified by the
sheer number of suits that have been brought under section 1983 since
the landmark decision of Monroe v. Pape.8 Judges and commentators
prevent violations of the fourteenth amendment and certain federal rights and to com-
pensate persons whose rights are nonetheless violated). But see Schuck, Suing Our Ser-
vants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980
SuP. CT. REV. 281, 339-45 (suggesting that section 1983 does not effectively accom-
plish the goals of victim compensation and deterrence).
See Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 15, 20-21 (1980).
8 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
In a series of cases near the turn of the century, the Supreme Court held that the
fourteenth amendment applied only to state action and that state action did not include
behavior by a state official that was illegal under state law. Since the fourteenth
amendment was viewed as not applying to ultra vires behavior by state officials, the
"privileges and immunities" clause of section 1983 was considered inapplicable to such
illegal actions. See Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1133, 1156-61 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Section 1983 and Federalism].
Under this narrow interpretation, section 1983 applied only to official action made
"pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute or local ordinance." Id. at 1168. The
Court's policy of not incorporating much of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment also restricted the scope of potential violations to which section 1983 ap-
plied. See S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 35; accord Section 1983 and Federalism,
supra, at 1169. This restrictive interpretation of section 1983 so discouraged potential
plaintiffs that only 21 cases were decided under the statute in the first 50 years after its
enactment. See Maine v. Thiboutout, 448 U.S. 1, 27 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
In Monroe the Court rejected the narrow interpretation of section 1983 by reinter-
preting the "under color of [state] law" requirement. This reinterpretation played a
significant role in the post-Monroe flood of section 1983 litigation.
Monroe held that section 1983 authorized a right of action not only in situations
where the constitutional or statutory deprivation was authorized by state law or by a
discriminatory application of state law, but also in situations where the violation was
made possible only because the public official was vested with the authority of state
law, even where the particular actions taken also violated state law. See Monroe, 365
U.S. at 184. The fact that state law also provided a remedy against the particular
action alleged was not a barrier to suit in federal court under section 1983, and there
was no requirement that the petitioner have first exhausted that state law remedy since
the federal remedy "is supplementary to the state remedy." Id. at 183. In addition the
range of possible violations to which section 1983 applied expanded as the Court incor-
porated more of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment. See Section 1983
and Federalism, supra, at 1169; see also S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 1168-70.
These factors combined to spark a tremendous increase in the number of section
1983 actions filed in the years after Monroe. "Between 1961 and 1979, the number of
federal filings under § 1983 (excluding suits by prisoners) increased from 296 to
13,168. Civil rights petitions by state prisoners increased from 218 cases in 1966, to
11,195 in 1979. In 1976, almost one out of every three 'private' federal question suits
filed in the federal courts was a civil rights action against a state or local official."
Whitman, supra note 7, at 6; see Note, Federalism, Section 1983 and State Law Rem-
edies: Curtailing the Federal Civil Rights Docket by Restricting the Underlying Right,
43 U. PrrT. L. REV. 1035, 1045 (1982); see also Aldisert, Judicial Expression of Fed-
eral Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity & Federal
Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. 557, 563 (calling post-Monroe filings a "deluge"
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alike have reacted to the tremendous increase in section 1983 litigation
with serious concern. They have pointed both to the increased vulnera-
bility of public officials to liability for damages9 and to the substantial
pressure on the federal judiciary from the increased caseload ° as rea-
sons for restricting the sweep of section 1983.
Such concerns have moved courts to re-examine methods for limit-
ing the impact of section 1983 upon public officials. In particular there
is renewed interest in the traditional immunity defenses that officials
may use to shield themselves from liability regardless of the merit of the
underlying claim. There are three types of immunity defenses that may
be raised in section 1983 litigation: sovereign immunity, which prohib-
its suits against the states;"1 absolute immunity, which prohibits suits
and noting 1100% rise in cases brought under the statute between 1960 and 1970).
Judge Aldisert concludes that the expanded reach of section 1983-generated claims en-
dangers judicial economy and federalism. But see Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal
Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. Rav. 482 (1982). Professor
Eisenberg argues that "section 1983 cases are not overwhelming the federal courts;
trivial claims, involving little if any federal policy, do not dominate district court dock-
ets, and courts are not, at the behest of state prisoners, eagerly overseeing minute de-
tails of prison life." Id. at 484. His study of section 1983 cases filed in the Central
District of California leads him to believe "that the number of cases is only a fraction
of what many of us have believed." Id. at 533.
9 Courts and commentators have expressed concern that the increased exposure of
public officials to personal liability affects their performance negatively, which, in turn,
has a deleterious effect on governmental operations. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 526-28 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Schuck, supra note 6. Schuck
argues that an important goal of any system of liability and immunity for government
decisionmakers should be to encourage officials "to execute their duties in a decisive,
selfless, and socially beneficial manner." Id. at 285. According to Schuck, this policy
objective of "vigorous decision-making" is disserved by imposing personal liability on
officials because fear of liability causes them to try to minimize the risk of liability by
engaging in "inaction, delayed action, formalism, and selection of the least risky deci-
sion alternative." Id. at 285, 313. See infra text accompanying notes 68-72.
10 See Aldisert, supra note 8 (discussing statute as source of burdensome litigation
that should often be in state, rather than federal, courts); Nahmod, The Mounting At-
tack on Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 A.B.A. J. 1586 (1981) (dis-
cussing caseload concern-based attacks on the scope of section 1983).
"I The Supreme Court has held that the eleventh amendment bars suits in a fed-
eral court by a private party against a state if those suits seek to obtain "retroactive
relief" by imposing "liability which must be paid from public funds in the state trea-
sury." Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979); see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 663 (1974). Although the eleventh amendment bars a private party from obtaining
such retroactive relief, a private party may still obtain prospective relief that enjoins
state officials to conform their conduct to the requirements of federal law. Such an
injunction may be obtained in federal court even though it has an "ancillary" effect on
the state treasury. Quern, 440 U.S. at 337. The Supreme Court has also held that
Congress did not intend section 1983 to overrule the traditional sovereign immunity of
the states guaranteed by the eleventh amendment. Id. at 341-45.
The Court has held, however, that the eleventh amendment does not apply to local
government units and has therefore permitted private parties to bring section 1983 ac-
tions against municipalities. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978) (local governments n6t entitled to absolute sovereign immunity under section
19841
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against the President, legislators, judges, and prosecutors acting within
their official capacities;12 and qualified immunity, which is available to
certain other public officials upon a showing that they acted in "good
faith.""3
In June 1982, the Supreme Court, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,1
4
redefined the standard to be used by courts in evaluating the availabil-
ity of the qualified immunity defense. Before Harlow, the Court had
never adequately clarified two important ambiguities in this immunity
defense: the standard by which a defendant-official's good faith was to
be tested'" and the degree to which the good faith inquiry was to be
grounded in the factual context of each suit.'6 Harlow ostensibly re-
solved these issues by holding that the good faith of an official seeking
qualified immunity was to be measured against an "objective" stan-
dard. 1 This objective inquiry was to rest upon a court's threshold de-
termination, prior to discovery, whether the applicable law was suffi-
ciently settled for a reasonable official to have guided her conduct by
1983 and may be sued for actions implemented under formal government policies or
sanctioned by government usage); see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622
(1980) (local government units not entitled to qualified immunity as a defense to sec-
tion 1983 actions).
12 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (the President); Eastland v.
United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (legislators); Stump v. Spark-
man, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)
(prosecutors).
'n Hence the term "qualified immunity." Qualified immunity is an affirmative
defense that shields officials who acted in good faith from liability. Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). The Court has held that the scope of protection afforded
by qualified immunity is affected by the function and the alleged actions of the individ-
ual defendant. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). ("[I]n varying
scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of govern-
ment, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of
the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the
action on which liability is sought to be based.").
14 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 29-56. Several case notes have commented
upon Harlow and its reformulation of the test for the determination of qualified immu-
nity issues. See, e.g, Comment, Entity and Official Immunities Under 42 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1983: The Supreme Court Adopts a Solely Objective Test, 28 S.D.L. Rav. 337
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Entity]; Note, Immunity: Eliminating the Sub-
jective Element from the Qualified Immunity Standard in Actions Brought Against
Government Officials, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 577 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, mn-
munity]; see also The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as Supreme Court, 1981 Term]. Other notes on Harlow have focused
more closely on the distinctions drawn in the case between qualified and absolute im-
munity. See, e.g., Case Note, Degree of Immunity Applicable to Senior Aides of the
President of the United States in Civil Actions Arising Under the Constitution: Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 1983 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 426.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 48-52.
17 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-20. See infra note 39 for definitions of "objective."
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Harlow's redefinition of the qualified immunity defense has
brought about "a quiet revolution in the law of official immunities."
It is a revolution with a lurking dark side. Because Harlow has the
potential to broaden dramatically the protection that the qualified im-
munity defense affords to public officials, it could undermine the signif-
icance of section 1983. Whether this happens will depend largely upon
the lower courts' interpretation of Harlow's broad language redefining
qualified immunity.
This Comment assesses Harlow's intended, actual, and potential
impact upon the qualified immunity defense under section 1983. Part I
relates the Supreme Court's development of section 1983 and the quali-
fied immunity defense prior to Harlow. Part II discusses the competing
policy concerns that must be balanced when, considering the appropri-
ate scope of the qualified immunity defense. Part III examines how
these policies led the Supreme Court to restructure the defense in
Harlow. The Comment, in part IV, then reviews the various ways in
which the lower courts are interpreting Harlow. It considers the impli-
cations of the varying approaches for the future of section 1983 litiga-
tion and advocates the adoption of the one approach that acc'omodates
the policy concerns underlying Harlow, yet that still preserves the sub-
stantive viability of section 1983 as a vehicle for vindicating federal
rights in federal courts.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECTION 1983 QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY DEFENSE
The defense of qualified immunity to liability under section 1983
is a product of judicial invention rather than statutory interpretation.
The text of the statute does not suggest the availability of any such
defense;20 rather, the defense derives from the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity, often stated as the maxim "the king can do no
wrong."21 The modern judicial development and refinement of immu-
nity doctrines has been spurred in large measure by the rise of suits
against public officials under section 1983.22
18 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-20.
19 Saldana v. Garza, 684 F.2d 1159, 1163 n.15 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 1253 (1983).
20 See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 504; see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 376 (1951). See supra note 1 for text of section 1983.
21 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-41 (1974). For a brief discussion of
the different types of immunity and who may claim them, see generally Comment,
Entity, supra note 15.
22 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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To state a cause of action under section 1983, a plaintiff must
allege a deprivation of a federal right by some persons, or person, act-
ing under color of state or territorial law.2" Qualified immunity is thus
an affirmative defense available to public officials in section 1983
cases.24 To avail herself of the defense, a defendant-official must prove
that she acted in good faith, that is, that she "reasonably believed" that
her action was lawful.25 The resolution of a defendant's claim of immu-
nity often determines the outcome of the case. If her claim is upheld,
the plaintiff loses. If the court rejects her immunity defense and the
plaintiff establishes the requisite violation, the defendant cannot prevail
unless she carries the difficult burden of proving that the plaintiff suf-
fered no injury.26
Because the resolution of the immunity issue has such a direct
bearing on the final disposition of a section 1983 action, the Supreme
Court has struggled to define the contours of the good faith showing
necessary foir an official to claim qualified immunity. Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald217 departs significantly from the approach taken in qualified im-
munity cases that preceded it by conferring greater protection upon
public officials. To understand fully the dimensions of the "quiet
revolution" 28 that Harlow brought about, it is necessary to consider the
case- law upon which it drew.
A. Case Law Preceding Harlow v. Fitzgerald
In 1967 the Court first suggested that a public official, sued under
section 1983 but unable to claim absolute immunity, might be entitled
to claim a conditional, or qualified, immunity. In Pierson v. Ray,29 the
Court considered the immunity claims of Mississippi police officers
who had arrested the plaintiffs-a group of white and black clergy-
23 See supra notes 1 & 4; see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).'
24 See supra note 6; see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
23 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
26 The injury that must be shown under section 1983 is a deprivation of a federal
statutory or constitutional right. See supra note 1 for text of section 1983.
Even if the qualified immunity defense fails, a defendant may also escape liability
if her action was not the "cause in fact" of the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. For
example, a difficult issue of cause in fact may arise in cases where "it is alleged that the
defendant. . . failed to act to prevent the violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights by
others." S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 86-87. Furthermore, some courts have applied
another tort principle and required that the defendant's action be the "proximate
cause" of the deprivation of plaintiff's rights. Id. at 83-86.
27 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
2 Saldana v. Garza, 684 F.2d 1159, 1163 n.15 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 1253 (1983).
29 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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men-on charges of having breached the peace by using segregated fa-
cilities.3 0 The Court held that the policemen were entitled to assert the
defense of qualified immunity because
[a] policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose
between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not
arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in
damages if he does . . . . [T]he same consideration would
seem to require excusing him from liability for acting under
a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid . . ..
Although Pierson announced the availability of a qualified immu-
nity defense conditioned upon some showing of "reasonable belief," it
did not define the content of the defense. Instead, the Court remanded
for the lower court to determine whether the-police could have "reason-
ably believed" that the statute under which they arrested the clergymen
was valid. 2
The next case, Scheuer v. Rhodes,"8 marked the Court's first effort
to define the elements of the good faith that secures immunity from
suit. Scheuer involved claims brought against the Governor of Ohio for
his decision to call upon the National Guard in the Kent State demon-
strations.' The Court held that the Governor was entitled to assert a
qualified immunity defense3 5 and then proceeded to discuss the content
of that defense.
Scheuer's analysis of the defense focused upon the nature of the
evidence to be considered in assessing an official's good faith. It did not,
however, establish the standard against which the official's conduct was
to be measured. Qualified immunity in general, the Court held, is con-
ditioned upon "the existence of reasonable grounds" for the official to
have believed, in good faith, "at the time and in light of all the circum-
stances," that her actions did not violate the plaintiff's rights."6
30 Id. at 548-49.
31 Id. at 555.
32 Id. at 557-58.
33 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
34 Id. at 234. The suits also involved claims against other state officials and of-
ficers as well as enlisted members of the National Guard.
35 In Scheuer the Governor argued that he was entitled to absolute immunity from
liability for his actions. The Court rejected this argument and stated that the protection
from judicial review that would be afforded by absolute immunity would mean that
section 1983 would be "drained of meaning." Id. at 248.
3. Id. at 247-48. However, the Court declined to apply this standard in Scheuer
because there wasinot enough evidence to determine whether the defendants had acted
in good faith. Id. at 250. The district court had ruled that the actions, although in form
against the named' individuals, were in substance and effect against the state and thus
were barred by the eleventh amendment. The district court, therefore, had dismissed
19841
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The Scheuer test, then, was fact-oriented; determinations regard-
ing immunity depended upon an evaluation of "all the circumstances"
of the case. Evaluation of all the circumstances, in turn, depended upon
the adequate development of a factual record.37 The implication of this
fact-oriented evaluation of good faith was that courts would find it ex-
tremely difficult to dispose of the qualified immunity question at an
early stage of the litigation - for example, prior to discovery.
While Scheuer's reasonableness test provided adequate guidance as
to the evidence upon which the good faith determination was to depend,
it was too vague to serve as a standard by which lower courts could
judge the reasonableness of an official's actions. 8 Scheuer did not spec-
ify whether evaluations of good faith should 'center on an "objective"
inquiry into the extent to which the law or right allegedly violated
should have been known by a reasonable official or, alternatively, on a
"subjective" inquiry into the extent to which the defendant-official's ac-
tual state of mind at the time she acted could be characterized as one of
good faith based upon a reasonable assessment of the circumstances and
the applicable law. 9 The Scheuer reasonableness test thus was suscep-
the action for lack of jurisdiction before the filing of an answer to any of the com-
plaints. Id. at 234-35.
37 Id. at 249-50.
" One commentator noted that Scheuer left unanswered a number of questions:
"did 'good faith' mean that government officials acted without malice or evil intent, that
they affirmatively believed that they were acting within the law or the limits of their
authority, or that they were following what they thought were lawful orders of their
superiors?" Friedman, The Good Faith Defense in Constitutional Litigation, 5 HoF-
STRA L. RaV. 501, 511-12 (1977).
3' The terms "objective" and "subjective" appear throughout discussions of quali-
fied immunity; their precise definitions are thus crucial to immunity considerations.
Yet, the terms are often used loosely. One commentator has characterized the "objec-
tive" inquiry as a requirement that a defendant have "reasonable grounds for . . .
belief in the legality of the challenged conduct" and the "subjective" inquiry as a re-
quirement that the defendant have "good faith in fact." See S. NAHMOD, supra note 2,
at 231.
The Supreme Court, in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), characterized
the two concepts similarly. In discussing the subjective standard of good faith, the Court
noted that a defendant should have acted "sincerely and with a belief that he is doing
right," that a defendant should have had "permissible intentions," and that the defend-
ant could not have acted with a "malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights or other injury." Id. at 321-22. Regarding the objective component of the
test for good faith, the Court said that the defendant could not disregard "settled indis-
putable law," had to know and respect "basic, unquestioned constitutional rights," and
would be liable if she "knew or reasonably should have known that the action [she]
took within [her] sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights"
of the person affected. Id.
As used in this Comment, a subjective test for good faith will involve an inquiry
into the defendant's actual knowledge of the law with which she is bound to comply,
and her actual intent-malicious or sincere-for acting. A subjective inquiry, therefore,
will depend heavily upon the facts and circumstances of any particular case. An objec-
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tible to different interpretations of the meaning of "good faith."'40
The following year, in Wood v. Strickland,'1 the Supreme Court
attempted to clarify the Scheuer test by confronting directly the ques-
tion whether the good faith necessary for qualified immunity should be
characterized as objective or subjective. In Wood the qualified immunity
issue arose in a suit brought by expelled school children against mem-
bers of a local school board.42 The district court ruled that the board
members were immune from suit because the students had not carried
their burden of proving that the school board members had acted mali-
ciously in deciding to expel them.4" The district court, therefore, ap-
plied an essentially subjective test to assess the board members' good
faith.
On appeal the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the lower
court's qualified immunity analysis rested upon an erroneous require-
ment of a showing of malice." It held that qualified immunity analysis
should be objective, rather than subjective. Thus, to defeat a qualified
immunity defense, the plaintiff had to prove that the officials' actions
were objectively unreasonable, rather than prove that they were moti-
vated by subjective ill-will or malice.45 Applying this standard, the cir-
cuit court held that, although the "[flaw with respect to the rights of
students is still developing,"'46 certain "reasonably well established"
doctrines indicated that students could not "be given lengthy suspen-
sions . . . without being accorded substantive and procedural due
process.'
4
7
tive test, in contrast, will focus primarily on a legal determination of the clarity and
settled nature of the law with which the defendant is required to comply. Her action is
to be measured against that which would have been taken by a reasonable official in
her position charged with knowledge of that law. These tests are neither mutually ex-
clusive nor easily separable. See infra text accompanying notes 106-11.
40 See Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 8, at 1212-13 (the term good
faith "itself assumed a more objective or subjective meaning, depending upon which
court was interpreting it").
41 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
42 Wood involved the claims of two students claiming that the school board mem-
bers violated their rights to due process, under color of state law, when they expelled
the students for violating a school regulation that prohibited the use or possession of
alcohol at school or school activities. Id. at 309-10.
4 Id. at 310.
41 Strickland v. Inlow, 486 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1973), vacated sub norn. Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
45 Id. at 191.
46 Id. at 189.
47 Id. The district court's subjective analysis proved to be, on the facts of the case,
more protective of the public officials than the objective analysis applied at the initial
appellate level. In contrast the Supreme Court's adoption of an exclusively objective test
in Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19, was interpreted by many commentators to foreshadow
an expansion of the protection afforded public officials by the qualified immunity de-
19841
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The contrast between the district and appellate court approaches
to qualified immunity presented the Supreme Court with an opportu-
nity to clarify Scheuer's reasonableness test.' Unfortunately, the
Court's opinion in Wood further muddied the analysis by combining
the two approaches to create a qualified immunity standard that explic-
itly encompassed both subjective and objective factors. Good faith, the
Court ruled, "necessarily contains elements of both" the subjective and
objective tests. 9 The Court required that a defendant seeking immunity
have acted both with "permissible intentions," and without "ignorance
or disregard of settled, indisputable law."50 The focus of the subjective
inquiry was upon the motives and intentions of the defendant-official,
essentially factual questions. In contrast the focus of the objective in-
quiry was upon whether the applicable law was settled or ambiguous,
an essentially legal question. A court had to apply both tests to the
challenged act before immunity attached to the defendant.
By imposing upon public officials a duty to know "basic, unques-
tioned constitutional rights,"51 Wood's objective test significantly de-
parted from the fact-intensive nature of the qualified immunity analysis
prescribed in Scheuer. Under Scheuer an official's reasonableness was
tested within the context of the facts and circumstances of each case.
5 2
Under Wood, however, an official's objective reasonableness was to be
measured against the degree to which the law in question was
knowable.
In Wood Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Chief Justice
Burger dissented 53 because they believed that the restructured objective
test imposed upon public officials an onerous duty to know the law,
fense. See, e.g., Supreme Court, 1981 Term, supra note 15, at 233-34. One should
thus embrace with caution any notion that the label attached to the good faith test itself
is sufficient to determine the coverage of the qualified immunity defense.
48 Although the Court treated the case as. one presenting the question of school
board members' immunity, the tests set forth in Wood were adopted as a "unitary"
standard applicable to all claims of qualified immunity. S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at
229-31; see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815 n.25 ("Subsequent cases. . . have quoted the
Wood formulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard.").
49 Wood, 420 U.S. at 321.
50 Id. at 321-22.
1 Id. at 322.
52 See S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 231-36; see also The Supreme Court, 1974
Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 49, 219-25 (1975) (discussing Wood v. Strickland and
Scheuer v. Rhodes).
88 Powell, the author of Harlow, concurred in part but dissented from that part of
the majority opinion that set forth the new definition of good faith affording qualified
immunity. The majority standard, Powell wrote, "appears to impose a higher standard
of care upon public school officials, sued under § 1983, than that heretofore required of
any other official." Wood, 420 U.S. at 327 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ig in part).
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forcing them to "act at the peril of some judge or jury subsequently
finding that a good-faith belief as to the applicable law was mistaken
and hence actionable."'" The dissenters worried that Wood's "more se-
vere standard" would "significantly enhanc[e] the possibility of per-
sonal liability" and would discourage qualified persons from seeking
public office.55 They therefore urged that the good faith inquiry con-
tinue to be governed by Scheuer.56
B. Qualified Immunity Analysis Under Wood v. Strickland
The Wood dissenters' fears were not realized. There were difficul-
ties in the interpretation and application of the standard,57 but in prac-
tice the objective aspect of the Wood test tended to work "rather rigidly
in a defendant's favor" because of its "peculiarly legal nature."5 " In
applying Wood lower courts measured the objective reasonableness of a
section 1983 defendant's action against the state of the applicable law
at the time of the defendant's alleged violation of that law. If a court
found the law to have been unclear, it upheld the defendant's claim of
immunity. Thus, the extent of protection afforded to public officials by
Wood's objective analysis depended upon the degree of uncertainty that
judges found in the law applicable to each particular case. Almost all
legal issues, of course, could be labeled as unclear by judges wishing to
4 Id. at 329. The majority did not perceive the standard to be problematic. It
noted that defendants would not be "'charged with predicting the future course of
constitutional law.'" Id. at 322 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967)).
51 Id. at 331. This concern reflects the political values behind immunity doctrines.
The juxtaposition of this concern with the majority's argument that "[a]ny lesser stan-
dard [of good faith] would deny much of the promise of § 1983," id. at 322, reveals the
inverse relationship between the breadth given to qualified immunity and the breadth
given to section 1983.
56 Scheuer, as characterized by the dissenters, presented a "considerably less de-
manding standard of liability." Id. at 330 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
57 See S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 230, 258 (asserting that the objective part of
the standard has caused "confusion and controversy" while the subjective part has been
"applied with little difficulty."); see also Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals
to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87
YALE L.J. 447 (1978). Newman argues that the objective standard "involves nearly
circular reasoning that promotes confusion and sometimes defeats meritorious claims."
He gives an example:
[I]f the plaintiff's own case requires him to show an arrest that was not
reasonably based on probable cause, what does the defense mean? Surely
the officer could not reasonably believe that there was probable cause for
an unlawful arrest, for an unlawful arrest is by definition an arrest for
which a prudent police officer could not reasonably believe there was
probable cause.
Id. at 460.
58 S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 237-38.
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do so." The very aspect of the objective test that Justice Powell found
threatening to public officials-the uncertain nature of the law 0-often
worked to the advantage of public officials.
The pro-defendant propensity of the Wood objective test could also
be enhanced if judges narrowly defined what applicable law was either
"settled" or "unquestioned," thus contracting the range of law about
which a defendant would have a duty to know.6 In Procunier v.
Navarette" the Court adopted precisely such a narrow view of "settled
law."
Procunier involved a prison inmate's section 1983 claims against
California prison officials. The prisoner alleged that he had been de-
prived of his rights under the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments
(as well as under California prisoner-mail regulations) by the failure of
prison officials to mail his various legal correspondence." The Court
held that in order to find that the officials had violated "clearly estab-
lished law" in withholding the mail privileges, the plaintiff had to
demonstrate a close factual conformity between the case at bar and the
previous case law establishing the illegality of the action at issue. After
canvassing the applicable cases, the Court ruled that the law was not
sufficiently established to justify holding that the prison officials had
acted unreasonably. The defendant's claim of qualified immunity was
upheld."
Procunier thus rendered the objective prong of the Wood qualified
immunity analysis considerably more protective of officials by requiring
a close similarity between the facts of a case at bar and the facts of
cases establishing applicable law." In so requiring, Procunier limited
" Nahmod has noted, "[U]nless there is a case on all fours from the relevant
circuit or the Supreme Court, most legal issues can be made to appear relatively uncer-
tain." Id. at 238.
" Powell argued, "One need only look to the decisions of this Court-to our re-
versals, our recognition of evolving concepts, and our five-to-four splits-to recognize
the hazard of even informed prophecy as to what are 'unquestioned constitutional
rights."' Wood, 420 U.S. at 329 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41 See, e.g., Gilliard v. Oswald, 552 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1977). There, the dissent-
ing judge argued that the majority's granting of immunity on the grounds that the law
was not settled was mistaken. He wrote, "The law in this area at the relevant time was
about as 'settled' and 'unquestioned' as law can ever be in our system of case-by-case
development of the contours of constitutional rights." Id. at 465, quoted in S. NAHMOD,
supra note 2, at 239.
o 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
" Id. at 556-58. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider issues of law
pertinent to the defendant's good faith claims.
See id. at 562-64.
See S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 245 (noting that Procunier indicated that
good faith requirements "could eventually be severely limited by the Court to those
situations where there is a case on point setting forth the existence of a constitutional
[Vol. 132:901
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 1983
the range of law an official was held to know upon pain of losing her
immunity. The Procunier gloss met the objections of the Wood dissent-
ers who had feared the objective test would prove unduly burdensome
on public officials. Wood's apparently strict "duty to know" could be
applied in a manner quite unforeseen by those dissenters.
Such a narrow view could adversely affect plaintiffs in two ways.
It could foreclose holdings favorable to those who bring suit under sec-
tion 1983 and who press rights that may be construed as unsettled. It
could also prove unduly restrictive of plaintiffs' claims in suits involving
settled rights that arise within an unusual factual context. 6 While such
redefinitions of the contours of the qualified immunity defense may fur-
ther certain policies underlying that defense, they may do so at the ex-
pense of competing policies that the section 1983 cause of action was
created and expanded to foster.67 To understand the nature of the con-
flict, it is necessary to understand the policies that the Court has at-
tempted to further in its development of the qualified immunity
defense.
II. POLICIES UNDERLYING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY DEFENSE
The cases in which the Supreme Court has considered the issue of
qualified immunity reflect consistent policy concerns, the primary one
being a desire to permit public officials to carry out their tasks without
fear of potential liability."8 In developing the qualified immunity de-
fense, the Court expressly has attempted to minimize the adverse effect
upon a public official's decisionmaking that results from the threat of
right"); see also Note, Basis of Liability in a Section 1983 Suit: When Is the State-of-
Mind Analysis Relevantl 57 IND. L.J. 459, 468-69, 476-77 (1982) (noting that
Procunier's analysis turns upon whether the right is clearly established, yet there are
no guidelines concerning the determination of clearly established rights, and the courts
are reluctant to find an injury is based upon such a right).
Procunier's narrow view of what constitutes a clearly established right has been
criticized as giving officials one "free" constitutional violation. See, e.g., Freed, Execu-
tive Official Immunity For Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72
Nw. U.L. REv. 526, 558-59 (1977) (suggesting that instead of using Procunier's nar-
row "settled law" approach, the object of qualified immunity standards should be to
eliminate "surprise liability" by requiring officials to act reasonably).
" See Section 1983 & Federalism, supra note 8, at 1216-17 (arguing that Wood
v. Strickland's objective test should be used in conjunction with an overall reasonable-
ness evaluation such as Scheuer v. Rhodes's immunity test, and warning that, other-
wise, section 1983 would be significantly cut back by immunity obtained through "re-
sort to formalistic arguments that the right violated was not of sufficiently settled legal
status to warrant an imputation of malice").
67 See infra text accompanying notes 76-79.
" See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 526-27 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); Schuck, supra note 6, at 314-15.
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personal liability. 9 The Court intended the qualified immunity defense
to ensure that public officials could act freely and to reduce the likeli-
hood of "[plublic officials. fail[ing] to make decisions when they are
needed or not act[ing] to implement decisions when they are made
")70
Without such a protective doctrine, commentators have noted, the
threat of personal liability might well induce self-protective behavior by
officials that would hamper their decisionmaking. Such behavior might
manifest itself in "inaction, delay, formalism, and a[n adverse] change
in the character of the decisions." The danger may be especially acute
in the case of low-level officials-for example, police officers-who
often must make difficult "judgment calls" without the opportunity for
prior reflection or guidance. 2
In addition to furthering the public interest by facilitating effective
government through unhampered decisionmaking, qualified immunity
also serves related efficiency policies. Efficient government is enhanced,
it is argued, by conserving the time and money of officials who might
otherwise be mired in extended and perhaps frivolous litigation. 3 The
qualified immunity doctrine also reflects increasing concern about the
growth of federal court dockets. 74 Section 1983 is associated with such
6 See, e.g, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240-42 (1974) (describing need for
and development of immunity doctrine).
70 Id. at 241-42.
71 Schuck, supra note 6, at 308.
72 See id. at 295-305.
" See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); Comment, Entity, supra
note 15, at 339, 354; cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (A judge "should not
have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or
corruption.").
74 See supra note 8.
Increasing caseloads have become a major cause of complaint and worry for the
federal judiciary. Among the voices sounding alarms about the courts' workload is that
of Justice Powell, author of the Harlow opinion. In a speech to the New York City
Bar, for example, Powell warned that "our system of justice is in trouble. The
problems are legion." He went on to attribute many of the problems to "court over-
load," which he characterized as an "ever-widening stream of litigation." Powell, Ori-
son S. Marden Memorial Lecture, 33 REc. A.B. Crry N.Y. 458-59 (1978).
Powell's speech also suggested that "claims under Section 1983" were among the
"underlying causes of court overload." Id. at 459, 465. He also expressed his feelings
concerning section 1983 litigation in his dissent in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1
(1980). The majority in Thiboutot held that a section 1983 claim could be based on
violation of federal statutory rights and need not allege a violation of a constitutional
right. Powell's dissent warned,
No one can predict the extent to which litigation arising from today's deci-
sion will harass state and local officials; nor can one foresee the number of
new filings in our already overburdened courts.
[T]here is some evidence that § 1983 claims already are being ap-
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concerns because of the "explosion" of such cases that followed Monroe
v. Pape.
7 5
These policies underlying qualified immunity, however, may con-
flict with the policies supporting the section 1983 cause of action. Sec-
tion 1983 was enacted to restrain public officials from abusing their
positions in violation of the law." It does so by deterring officials from
engaging in such abuses and by providing a remedy to compensate vic-
tims of unconstitutional official behavior." This intended restraint is
the very essence of the section that "enforce[s] provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a
State and represent it in some capacity.""8 Yet, when a court terminates
a section 1983 action by immunizing a defendant-official, many plain-
tiffs have no alternative cause of action and are thus left without rem-
edy for violations of their constitutional rights. 9
In the qualified immunity cases, the Court has struggled to bal-
ance these competing policies. Harlow v. Fitzgerald80 represents the
latest, and most definitive, attempt to achieve a just balance.
III. Harlow v. Fitzgerald
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald Ernest Fitzgerald alleged that Bryce
Harlow and Alexander Butterfield, senior White House aides to former
pended to complaints solely for the purpose of obtaining fees in actions
where 'civil rights' of any kind are at best an afterthought.
448 U.S. at 23-24 (Powell, J., dissenting).
7 See supra note 8.
78 See supra note 2; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-76 (1961) ("It
was . . .the failure of certain States to enforce the laws with an equal hand that
furnished the powerful momentum behind this 'force bill,'" and the remedy ultimately
created was directed "against those who representing a State in some capacity were
unable or unwilling to enforce a state law.").
7 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174-77.
78 Id. at 172.
79 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (stating that where
public officials have abused their power, a suit for damages may be the most feasible
method of compensating the injured party); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Nar-
cotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in Bivens' shoes it is damages or
nothing.").
80 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
" 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Harlow was not brought under section 1983 but was
instead a "Bivens-type action." While an action brought under section 1983 is against
state officials, a "Bivens-type" action is brought against federal officials. See Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see also Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (holding that it is "untenable" to distinguish between suits
brought against state officials and suits brought against federal officials for purposes of
immunity analysis). Harlow's modification of qualified immunity was, however, explic-
itly made applicable to immunity defenses brought under section 1983 as well as in
Bivens actions. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.30.
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President Nixon, had conspired with Nixon 2 to dismiss Fitzgerald
from his post as an Air Force management analyst, to cover up his
unlawful discharge, and to prevent his re-employment.'
The Court held that Harlow and Butterfield were entitled only to
a qualified, rather than absolute, immunity defense." The Court then
modified the defense by basing the question of the good faith that enti-
tled officials to qualified immunity solely upon an objective inquiry.
Under Harlow the qualified immunity defense shields "government of-
ficials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." 5
The majority opinion by Justice Powell clearly set forth the policy
concerns that impelled the Court to modify the good faith test. Claims
against federal or state officials, Powell wrote,
frequently run against the innocent as well as the guilty-at
a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to the society as
a whole. These social costs include the expenses of litigation,
the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues,
and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public
office. 86
A subjective qualified immunity test subverted these policies, Powell
noted, because it posed a basically factual question. Answering such a
question might well "entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing
" Nixon was named in a companion case, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731
(1982). In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court held that the President was entitled to abso-
lute immunity from liability for all actions taken within the "outer perimeter" of his
official duties.
0 Fitzgerald testified before a congressional committee, alleging cost overruns in
defense contracts; his testimony was a source of much embarrasment for the Defense
Department. He was subsequently discharged from his job, purportedly as a conse-
quence of the reorganization of his department. Fitzgerald alleged that the dismissal
was, in fact, retaliation for his congressional testimony. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802-
06; see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. at 733-39.
" Harlow and Butterfield argued that they were entitled to absolute immunity
derived from the President's immunity because the President "must delegate a large
measure of authority to execute the duties of his office [and] . . . recognition of deriva-
tive absolute immunity is made essential by all the considerations that support absolute
immunity for the President himself." The Court disagreed with their analysis and held,
instead, that the aides were entitled only to qualified immunity. See Harlow, 457 U.S.
at 810.
" Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. The Court bluntly set forth its mqtive for changing
the test: "The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently has proved incom-
patible with our admonition . that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial."
Id. at 815-16.
" Id. at 814.
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of numerous persons, including an official's professional colleagues.", 7
The subjective inquiry not only had the potential for requiring
extensive discovery, but it also inhibited the expeditious disposition of
claims on summary judgment because "an official's subjective good
faith has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts have
regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury."" In sum the
Court reasoned that wide-ranging investigations of a public official's
mental state at the time she acted were "peculiarly disruptive" to the
operation of government.89 It therefore held that an official would no
longer be required to demonstrate subjective good faith to establish a
qualified immunity defense.
Having discarded the subjective strand of qualified immunity anal-
ysis, embraced in Wood v. Strickland," the Court proceeded to modify
significantly the objective strand that remained. Again emphasizing ex-
pedience, the Court held that discovery regarding the merits of a claim
should not proceed until an official's claim of qualified immunity had
been tested against an objective standard. This evaluation of good faith
could not be made, moreover, until a court identified "the currently
applicable law" with which an official was required to comply and de-
termined "whether that law was clearly established at the time an ac-
tion occurred." ' This new formulation of the objective strand of quali-
fied immunity analysis, Powell explained, was expressly designed to
"avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of
many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.;
9 2
In Harlow Justice Powell thus relied on the objective test to ac-
complish precisely the opposite of what he had feared from the applica-
tion of such a test in Wood. Powell had then vigorously dissented be-
cause he believed the test exposed defendants to an increased risk of
liability. In Harlow, however, he reshaped the objective test to in-
crease the protection afforded to public officials by qualified immunity.
The defense was henceforth to function as a mechanisni for cutting off
insubstantial claims and thereby to reduce the burdens of section 1983
litigation upon both defendant-officials and federal courts.
17 Id. at 817. It should also be noted that the Court may have been considering
the toll of section 1983 litigation upon the operations of the judicial, as well as the
executive, branch of government. Justice Powell, the author of Harlow, has frequently
expressed concern regarding the burden on the federal courts posed by this type of
litigation. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
" Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.
89 Id. at 817.
90 420 U.S. 308 (1975); see supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
91 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
92 Id.
13 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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Harlow's redefinition of the objective test illustrates the impact ex-
cessively narrow views of "settled law," such as that expressed in
Procunier v. Navarette,9 " have had on qualified immunity analysis.
This reformulation of the seemingly strict Wood v. Strickland objective
test into a device that favors defendants was made possible only because
this groundwork had already been laid. With Harlow the development
of the qualified immunity defense has culminated in the adoption of a
new objective standard that serves as a conscious device for cutting off
plaintiffs' claims.
A. Application of the Harlow Standard
Under Harlow qualified immunity analysis measures the "objec-
tive reasonableness of an official's conduct" by "reference to clearly es-
tablished law." 5 After identifying the relevant legal issues, a judge
must then decide whether the law regarding those issues was clearly
established at the time of the defendant's actions. If the judge deter-
mines that the law was not clearly established, then the defendant will
be granted immunity from suit. If the judge determines that the law in
question was clearly established, then "the immunity defense ordinarily
should fail." 98 A public official who acted in violation of such estab-
lished law may still claim immunity, however, if she claims "extraordi-
nary circumstances and can prove that [she] neither knew nor should
have known of the relevant legal standard. '97 Such an assertion, like all
post-Harlow qualified immunity claims, is to "turn primarily on objec-
tive factors."98
Whether a defendant may successfully claim qualified immunity
after Harlow therefore depends upon a court's threshold, pre-discovery
determination whether the law with which she was expected to comply
was "clearly established."9' 9 The concept of established law had already
engendered difficulties under the objective part of Wood v. Strickland's
qualified immunity test.100 Although the Court, in Harlow, was pre-
sumably aware of the confusion created by Wood, it did not clarify the
phrase "clearly established law." The Court instead noted, "[W]e need
not define here the circumstances under which the 'state of the law'
434 U.S. 555 (1978).
" Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
" Id. at 818-19.
9 Id. at 819.
98 Id. at 818-19. A defendant may still avoid liability even without immunity if
the plaintiff cannot demonstrate an injury.
" Id. at 818.
10 See supra text accompanying notes 48-51 & 57.
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should be 'evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the
Courts of Appeals, or of the local District Court.' "'o' Thus, the Court
gave little explicit guidance to the lower courts regarding interpretation
and application of the new qualified immunity test.
Nevertheless, Harlow's language provides some clues as to the na-
ture and scope of the threshold legal determination that the Court envi-
sioned. The opinion implies that a court should require that there be
some degree of factual correspondence between applicable precedents
and the case to be determined. Thus the Court's observation that a
defendant may not "fairly be said to 'know' that the law forbade con-
duct" if that conduct had "not [been] previously identified as unlaw-
ful" 10 2 suggests that the factual contexts of the relevant case law should
bear sufficient similarity to the instant factual context to inform the
official that her conduct was unlawful.
The Court left open, however, the critical question of the degree to
which the facts of a plaintiff's case must correspond to the facts of prior
cases in order to demonstrate that the law in question was established
and thereby defeat a defendant's claim of qualified immunity. As was
made evident by Procunier and other objective immunity analyses
under the Wood standard, the degree of factual correspondence required
to classify relevant law as "clearly established" can be dispositive of
whether a claim of qualified immunity will survive a motion for sum-
mary judgment.1 0 s
The question appears to be even more critical under Harlow be-
cause the Court has mandated that this determination of factual corre-
spondence be made at the very "earliest stage of the litigation, before
discovery.10' It may not be possible, however, for lower courts to com-
ply with this mandate.1 05 A court may not make its "threshold determi-
nation" until it has first been presented with a claim of qualified im-
munity. Such a claim will often arise on a motion for summary
judgment, which will, in and of itself, halt discovery. The court's ruling
101 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.32 (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555,
565 (1978)). For a discussion of the confusion wrought by the Wood formulation, see S.
N]AHMOD, supra note 2, at 230.
102 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
los See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
104 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
105 Some lower courts have also noted that resolution of certain cases will require
consideration of factual issues. See, e.g., Gannon v. Daley, 561 F. Supp. 1377, 1388
(N.D. IM. 1983). Furthermore, cases involving issues such as probable cause for arrest
necessarily involve some consideration of underlying factual questions.
The concurrence in Harlow acknowledges that consideration of factual issues may
be necessary to determine what a defendant knew concerning the law she allegedly
violated. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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on the motion, however, may well depend upon whether the plaintiff
can show that the facts of her case correspond sufficiently to the facts of
prior cases to justify holding the defendant liable for non-compliance
with "established law." Such a showing, however, may in turn depend
upon discovery and development of the factual aspects of the case,
which Harlow appears to preclude.
This internal inconsistency-prohibition of discovery during a
threshold determination that may require development of a factual re-
cord-created sufficient ambiguity in the majority opinion to enable the
concurring Justices to claim that they were agreeing with the majority,
when in fact they were advocating a substantially different, pro-plain-
tiff standard.
B. The Harlow Concurrence
The concurring opinion of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun in Harlow, although superficially in agreement with the ma-
jority, presents a qualified immunity analysis that could produce results
very different from those contemplated by the majority.'0 6 The concur-
rence, authored by Justice Brennan, begins by noting its agreement
"with the substantive standard announced by the Court today, impos-
ing liability when a public-official defendant 'knew or should have
known' of the constitutionally violative effect of [her] actions."' 107 At
this point, however, the substantive agreement ends. The concurrence
interprets the majority standard as denying protection to any official
who "actually knows that [she] was violating the law," even if her
knowledge could not "'reasonably have been expected'" by a judge
108 The majority opinion in Harlow was joined by eight of the nine Justices; only
Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that aides were entitled to absolute immunity.
457 U.S. at 822-29 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
There were three concurrences in Harlow. One, by Justice Rehnquist, was very
brief, noting only that the holding in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), should
be re-examined. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 822. In Butz Rehnquist dissented in part, argu-
ing that federal executive officials were entitled to absolute, rather than qualified, im-
munity. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 517-30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
Another concurrence, by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, em-
phasized that their votes in Harlow did not imply any agreement with the grant of
absolute presidential immunity given in Nixon v. Fitzgerald. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at
821-22 (Brennan, J., concurring).
The first concurrence appearing in the text, to which this Comment will refer
simply as "the concurrence," was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
mun. It sets forth a different interpretation of the new qualified immunity test. See id.
at 820-21 (Brennan, J., concurring). Although the divergence in interpretation appears
slight, it makes room for an approach to qualified immunity analysis that is radically
different from that of the majority. See infra text accompanying notes 108-11.
107 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 820-21 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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making the threshold objective determination of established law. 08 The
concurrence focuses upon the defendant's actual knowledge;.thus Jus-
tice Brennan observes that "it seems inescapable to me that some mea-
sure of discovery may sometimes be required to determine exactly what
a public-official defendant did 'know' at the time of [her] actions."' 0 9
For the concurring Justices discovery and factual analysis would still be
necessary, at least in some cases, to make the mandated threshold deter-
mination of immunity issues." 0
The concurrence's emphasis on actual knowledge and particular
factual contexts suggests that its version of objective qualified immunity
analysis actually imports into the Harlow objective inquiry elements of
the Wood v. Strickland subjective standard that the Harlow majority
discarded. The qualified immunity test, as the concurrence character-
ized it, calls for an inquiry into the defendant's state of mind, turning
upon what the defendant knew, as well as what the law said. According
to the concurrence, a defendant-official's good faith would be evaluated
within the factual context of a particular case, rather than by exclusive
reference to the legal context defining the issues of the case."'
The analysis of the concurrence offers lower courts a choice re-
108 Id. at 821.
109 Id.
110 See id. This emphasis contrasts sharply with that of the majority opinion with
which the concurring Justices are ostensibly in agreement. The majority opinion al-
lowed only in the most grudging terms that a factual inquiry into a defendant's knowl-
edge might, in some cases, be necessary: only "if the official pleading the defense claims
extraordinary circumstances and can prove that [she] neither knew nor should have
known of the relevant legal standard." Even in this extraordinary case, "the defense
would turn primarily on objective factors." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (majority
opinion).
"I See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between
subjective and objective analyses).
The contrast between the interpretations of the majority and the concurrence high-
lights the ambiguous nature of the terms "objective" and "subjective." In the concur-
rence an "objective" test is made to encompass an inquiry into a defendant's state of
mind, that is her actual knowledge. Such an inquiry would seem characteristic of a
subjective test.
The concurrence characterized the state of the law that confers immunity as "so
ambiguous at the time of the alleged violation that it could not have been 'known.'"
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring). The implication is that there may
be a level of somewhat ambiguous law-not "so ambiguous. . . that it could not have
been 'known' "-at which liability may still be imposed. Id. (emphasis added). If this is
so, then the concurrence essentially would hold that a defendant may be required to
know, or acquire knowledge of, the law. Such a requirement, at the least, loudly echoes
the standard originally enunciated in Wood v. Strickland: a duty to know and act
within the law. See Wood, 420 U.S. at 321-22.
Justice Powell, author of Harlow, strongly objected to the Wood qualified immu-
nity standard. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. The concurrence's return to at
least some of the subjective elements of the old standard suggests more distance between
it and the Harlow majority than the concurrence admits.
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garding the application of Harlow's redefined standard. In searching
out the applicable law, they may look to a broad or narrow range of
precedent. In defining the evidence necessary to make this threshold
determination, they may look solely to the law or, alternatively, to the
official's knowledge of the law as revealed by the particular factual con-
text of the case. The choice the lower courts make may well determine
whether many plaintiffs can continue to rely on section 1983 to vindi-
cate their constitutional claims in federal courts.
IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SINCE Harlow v. Fitzgerald
In order to apply a standard that uses "clearly established law" as
its reference point, courts must understand the content of that category.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald"' attempted to offer some guidance to the lower
courts by describing the authorities to which a court might look in de-
termining whether the applicable law was "clearly established"':
opinions from the Supreme Court, all circuit courts, and the local dis-
trict court.""
Courts have taken varying approaches in their consideration of
this relatively straightforward suggestion. Some courts have held the
extreme view that only Supreme Court opinions should be considered;
others have searched diligently through all levels of the federal system
from a variety of jurisdictions." 5 Similarly, courts have differed over
how they should respond to an absence of applicable case law. Some
courts have regarded the absence of case treatment as a sign that the
law governing the issues in question is not "established," even when the
applicable issue or statute is arguably clear.
1 16
112 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
11 Id. at 818 n.32 (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978)).
114 Id.
'" Compare, e.g., Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1001-02 (7th Cir. 1982) (con-
sidering Supreme Court cases, as well as cases from various courts of appeals and
district courts, to determine whether the law with respect to certain behavior by prison
officials was clearly established) with Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201,
1210-11 (7th Cir. 1983) (considering only one Supreme Court case in determining
whether law was clearly established).
I1 See Estes-E1 v. New York, 552 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In Estes-El, the
plaintiff was arrested, without a warrant, by the defendants, environmental conserva-
tion officers, for fishing without a license. New York statutes provided such officers
with the power to make warrantless arrests when a misdemeanor was committed in
their presence; fishing without a license was classified as an "infraction," not a misde-
meanor. The court was persuaded, however, that the powers of environmental conser-
vation officers were unclear because another New York statute gave those officials po-
lice officer status, and police officers can arrest persons for "infractions." In the absence
of court interpretations of environmental conservation officers' powers, the court held
that the defendants had acted in "good faith," believing their actions to have been au-
thorized. Id. at 888. Compare Heslip v. Lobbs, 554 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (in
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Harlow did not even attempt to resolve, however, the most difficult
question that is faced by a court attempting to apply the redefined
qualified immunity standard: the extent to which courts should require
a correspondence between the facts of "establishing" cases and the facts
of the case under consideration. 
1
7
In the absence of adequate guidance, lower courts have taken three
approaches to this problem. The first demands a relatively strict factual
correspondence between the cases establishing law and the case at
hand. 18 The second demands less factual correspondence; it recognizes
a duty on the part of defendant-officials to apply general legal princi-
ples to specific factual situations." 9 The third demands that officials
discern trends establishing general principles of law and apply those
principles, when required, to particular situations.' 20 The approach a
court chooses may be dispositive of the plaintiff's section 1983 claim.
A. The First Approach: Strict Factual Correspondence
The first approach requires a tight factual fit between cases estab-
lishing the applicable law and the case under consideration. Before they
will characterize law as clearly established, courts taking this approach
require that there be cases from the proper jurisdiction closely on
point. '
2
determining whether defendant officers validly arrested the plaintiff for public drunk-
enness in a private home, court noted that the meaning of "public place" had only been
construed in one case, which gave little aid in the instant case; therefore, the court held,
the law was not clearly established, and defendants were entitled to immunity) with
Benford v. American Broadcasting Cos., 554 F. Supp. 145, 153-54 (D. Md. 1982)
(denying defendants' claim that Federal Eavesdropping Statute provided no clear
standard).
117 See supra text accompanying notes 101-03. For the confusion thereby engen-
dered, see, e.g., Hixon v. Durbin, 560 F. Supp. 654, 664-65 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("Unfor-
tunately, in announcing the new test for qualified immunity in Harlow, the Supreme
Court expressly declined to define what criteria a rule of law would have to meet in
order to be deemed 'clearly established' . . . ." The court continued, "Presumably,
every principle of law which is essential to the conclusion that the defendant violated
plaintiff's rights must be 'clearly established' for the qualified immunity defense to
fail." The court wondered, "Is the defense intended to establish a 'one bite' rule for
government officials, so that they will be protected from liability for damages until
another official has been held to have violated the Constitution in a case involving
identical factual circumstances?" (citation omitted)).
118 See infra text accompanying notes 121-38.
, See infra text accompanying notes 139-53.
120 See infra text accompanying notes 154-71.
121 See, e.g., National Black Police Ass'n v. Velde, 712 F.2d 569, 576 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (defendants did not violate clearly established rights under Title VI, although
they did not necessarily comply with the statute); Saldana v. Garza, 684 F.2d 1159,
1165 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1253 (1983) (an arrest must be "so
illegal" as to violate clearly established law before immunity will be denied); Piccollela
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This approach was used in Calloway v. Fauver.2' The plaintiffs
were prison inmates involuntarily placed in indefinite protective cus-
tody.1 23 They alleged that the protective custody-in facilities far less
desirable than those inhabited by the general prison popula-
tion-constituted a deprivation of statutory and due process rights.
They based their claim on the lack of a hearing regarding their initial
confinement in protective custody, the absence of hearings regarding the
continuation of their confinement, and, when they finally were ac-
corded a hearing by court order, the defendants' use of previously un-
disclosed evidence.
12 4
Regarding the defendants' claims of qualified immunity, the dis-
trict court began by noting that the law applicable to the case had been
developing since 1974, when the Supreme Court first defined the na-
ture and scope of an inmate's due process rights to a hearing.125 In that
year the Court held in Wolff v. McDonell 28 that an inmate's liberty
interests were implicated by disciplinary hearings and transfers to se-
curity units and that prison authorities were thus required to comply
with procedural due process requirements. 27
In Calloway the district court found that the prison authorities had
in fact violated the plaintiffs' due process rights; the prisoners were
entitled to "an annual hearing complying with Wolff v. McDonnell
standards to enable [them] to contest the continued need for protective
custody."1 28 Nevertheless, the court upheld the defendants' claim of im-
munity, on the basis of the Harlow standard, because the plaintiffs'
rights to such hearings had not been clearly established at the time the
v. Rieck, 555 F. Supp. 27, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (defendants entitled to qualified immu-
nity where they instructed bank to deny access to a safe deposit box before a warrant
was obtained despite earlier case, United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982), which held that prolonged warrantless seizure of
baggage was illegal, because the facts of the case at bar were not deemed similar to
those of Place).
This type of analysis is reminiscent of judicial treatment of the objective standard
in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying
text. It also recalls Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). See supra notes 62-65
and accompanying text.
122 544 F. Supp. 584 (D.N.J. 1982).
12s The protective custody was deemed necessary because plaintiffs had been in-
volved in the killing of the leader of a religious sect to which a large faction of the
prison's inmates belonged. That faction had fought a rival religious sect to which the
plaintiffs belonged. Prison officials believed the plaintiffs would be in great peril in
light of plans by the first faction to avenge the death of its leader if the plaintiffs were
returned to the general prison population. Id. at 588-92.
124 Id. at 587.
125 Id. at 607.
126 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
127 Id. at 557-58.
128 Calloway, 544 F. Supp. at 607.
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rights were violated. 29
The court's decision that the law defining the plaintiffs' rights was
not "clearly established" rested on the ground that, notwithstanding the
general guidelines in Wolff, no Supreme Court case had addressed the
specific issue of whether an inmate was entitled to periodic hearings
regarding the continuation of involuntary, long-term, protective cus-
tody.130 In so holding, the district court rejected the authority of cases
from several circuits that addressed closely related issues, including a
Third Circuit case that recognized that due process rights attached
upon administrative transfers to maximum security units (the case did
not consider the specific question of periodic hearings in long-term cus-
tody situations).3 ' The court also distinguished an Eighth Circuit case
that held that prisoners in protective custody should have their status
"reviewed periodically in a meaningful way"1 2 on the basis that it had
not specified that such status reviews must meet the requirements of
Wolff v. McDonnell. Finally, the court asserted that "recent district
court cases in other districts," even if directly on point, could not "be
said to create clearly established constitutional rights which would strip
defendants of their qualified immunity." 3 The court further stated
that, even if these cases had established such rights, a court could not
reasonably expect the defendants to know of them.
Thus, although there was a significant body of law at all three
federal judicial levels establishing that due process rights attached to the
administrative transfer of prison inmates to maximum security units,
the Calloway court did not find such cases sufficient to hold the defen-
dants responsible for according similar rights to prisoners who had al-
ready been transferred to such units and who were seeking transfers
within the unit. The court apparently required cases exactly, or nearly
exactly, on point.'"
129 Id.
1s0 See id.
is' See id.
132 Id.
I"5 Id.
183 The court found that the law was not clearly established despite the fact that
Wolff v. McDonnell, the initial Supreme Court case from which "[t]he law in this area
has been evolving" to expand and define "the rights of inmates to due process hear-
ings," was decided in 1974, before the plaintiff's incarceration in the maximum security
unit. See id.
Furthermore, in Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Cal. 1976), affd
mnern., 434 U.S. 1052 (1978), the Supreme Court held that this liberty interest was also
implicated when inmates were transferred to maximum security units for administra-
tive reasons, including protective custody purposes such as those in Calloway. These
requirements were also embodied in the New Jersey standard in effect in 1975, the
year when plaintiffs were placed in administrative segregation. Calloway, 544 F. Supp.
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Calloway requires, for a finding of official liability, an unrealisti-
cally high and generally unattainable degree of certainty in the applica-
ble law.13 5 The incapacity of the law to reach this degree of certainty
may well lead courts that follow this first approach to grant immunity
in virtually all cases. While such an approach serves the policy of pro-
tecting public officials from frivolous suits, it cannot serve the equally
important policy, also emphasized in Harlow,13 of holding officials lia-
ble for egregious violations of clearly established law. On the contrary
it might lead public officials to believe they may have "one bite" of the
apple for any particular constitutional violation."3 '
If courts consistently require that the cases establishing the appli-
cable law bear a strict factual correspondence to the cases under consid-
eration, individual section 1983 claims arising in slightly varying fac-
tual contexts may be completely foreclosed, as the Calloway result itself
amply demonstrates. More generally, Calloway's approach thwarts the
development of potential causes of action that might otherwise emerge
from individual cases, were they to survive the qualified immunity de-
fense. Thus the usefulness of section 1983 as a tool to develop and ex-
pand the realm of civil rights may be significantly limited. To the ex-
tent that courts employ this strict approach, protection and development
of civil rights via section 1983 will most likely stagnate." 8"
at 607.
131 Cf Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 329 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (re-
jecting majority notion of "settled indisputable law" and "unquestioned constitutional
rights").
136 Harlow noted that "[in situations of abuse of office, an action for damages
may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional rights." Harlow,
457 U.S. at 814 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Bivens v. Six Un-
known Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
137 See, e.g., Hixon v. Durbin, 560 F. Supp. 654, 665 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (Court
found that defendants, Acting Attorney-General and General Counsel of Pennsylvania,
had violated plaintiff's due process rights by denying him a renewed employment con-
tract. Nevertheless, the court felt compelled by Harlow to uphold defendants' claims of
qualified immunity, noting that the Supreme Court might well have "intended to estab-
lish a 'one bite' rule for government officials, so that they will be protected from liabil-
ity for damages until another official has been held to have violated the Constitution in
a case involving identical factual circumstances.").
1l This result may well be what Justice Powell intended to achieve through
Harlow's modification of the qualified immunity test, given his concern that the crea-
tion of rights "inviting redress in the courts generat[ed] an ever-widening stream of
litigation" and thus increased the federal caseload. See Powell, Orison S. Marden Me-
morial Lecture, supra note 74, at 459 (footnote omitted); see also Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1, 20-26 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
The weakening of section 1983 and its counterpart, the Bivens-type damages ac-
tion against federal officials, is a development that some judges will welcome and en-
courage. One court, for instance, praised Harlow's "efforts to cram the Bivens genie
back into the bottle" and noted that
[Harlow] may be read as intending to encourage the district courts, in
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B. The Second Approach: Application of General Legal Principles
The second approach that the lower courts have used is less rigid
than the first. It requires defendants to know and apply general legal
principles in appropriate factual situations. Defendants are not re-
quired to "predic[t] the future course of constitutional law"1 9 but must
consider the possible relevance of law established in analogous factual
situations.14 °
An example of this approach is found in Anderson v. Central
Point School District No. 6.141 In Anderson a schoolteacher/athletic
coach sent his proposals for changing the district's athletic policies and
programs directly to the School Board, rather than sending them first to
his immediate supervisor as required by the district's "channels rules."
The superintendent removed him from his coaching duties for violating
the channels rules. The teacher thereupon sued the superintendent in-
dividually and the school board under section 1983, claiming that he
had been removed from his coaching duties for exercising his first
amendment rights. The defendant superintendent raised the defense of
Bivens litigation, to grant summary judgment in favor of harried federal.
officials on the issue of "good faith," in advance of trial, and indeed before
a non-frivolous plaintiff has had a chance to avail himself of the usual
hectoring, expensive and dilatory pre-trial depositions of which the federal
judiciary appears to be so fond.
Dale v. Bartels, 552 F. Supp. 1253, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The court was pessimistic,
however; in advocating absolute immunity, it noted, "[t]he Harlow decision seems to us
a small court-plaster which cannot stanch the hemorrhage of governmental efforts and
resources expended in avoiding or resisting the ever increasing spiteful and unfounded
torrent of Bivens claims." Id. at 1266 n.1.
While the Dale v. Bartels language is more vehement than that in most discus-
sions of section 1983 and Bivens actions, the court's wish to reduce such litigation may
be a relatively common attitude within the federal judiciary. But see Eisenberg, supra
note 8, at 482, 484 (discussing and disagreeing with "false impressions about the nature
and burden of section 1983 litigation").
IS9 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
140 See, e.g., Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1381-82 (11th Cir. 1982) (legal
principles set forth in previous case, that certain Alabama prison conditions constitute
cruel and unusual punishment, apply to plaintiff's situation and preclude defendants'
immunity), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 335 (1983); Lowe v. Carter, 554 F. Supp. 831
(E.D. Mich. 1982) (denying defense of immunity where prison officials ignored plain-
tiff's attempts to challenge confinement in administrative segregation despite Depart-
ment of Corrections rule mandating monthly review of a prisoner's administrative seg-
regation status); Benford v. American Broadcasting Cos., 554 F. Supp. 145 (D. Md.
1982) (fourth amendment standards of privacy set forth in Katz apply to filming of
insurance salesman presenting cancer insurance to members of investigatory congres-
sional team posing as prospective purchasers); Nakao v. Rushen, 545 F. Supp. 1091,
1092-93 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (case law holding in-prison warrantless search permissible
only for "justifiable purpose[s] of imprisonment or prison security" bars defendant's
assertion of good faith defense in case where jury could reasonably conclude that search
in issue served none of the permitted purposes).
141 554 F. Supp. 600 (D. Or. 1982).
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immunity, asserting that the plaintiff had been disciplined, not in retal-
iation for any exercise of constitutional rights, but rather because he
had violated the district's administrative rules.1 42 If those rules violated
"clearly established" first amendment rights, the defendant argued, he
had had no way of so knowing.
Both parties in Anderson referred to Pickering v. Board of Educa-
tion1 43 for an enumeration of the factors to be balanced to determine
whether a teacher's communications to a school board constituted pro-
tected speech. The superintendent argued that Pickering did not clearly
establish whether the channels rules were impermissible, that there was
therefore no "clearly established" law against disciplining teachers for
violations of those rules, and that as a public official he was accordingly
entitled to claim qualified good faith immunity.
1 44
The trial court disagreed with the defendant's characterization of
Pickering. It began by observing that the Supreme Court had held,
since Pickering, "that any law which imposes a prior restraint on the
exercise of first amendment rights comes to the court 'with a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity.' 145 The court viewed
the channels rules as such a prior restraint; this characterization was
based upon Rosen v. Port of Portland,46 a Ninth Circuit case, which
held that advance notice requirements that condition the exercise of free
speech rights are unconstitutional. 1 4 Although Rosen had been decided
two days after the superintendent had dismissed the plaintiff from his
coaching job, the Anderson court felt that the case demonstrated that
"'the constitutional standard was clearly established'" because Rosen
itself drew upon previous cases that clearly indicated that the channels
rules constituted a violation of first amendment rights.148
The Anderson court thus held the defendant responsible both for
142 Id. at 603-04, 608.
143 391 U.S. 563, 569-73 (1968). Pickering established "guidelines for determin-
ing whether a plaintiff's conduct is protected activity." Anderson, 554 F. Supp. at 606.
The guidelines require that a citizen's interest in commenting upon matters of public
concern be "balanced" with the interests of the school district in "providing efficient
public service." Id. Further, because the school system is a general public concern,
persons within the system "have the right to publicly address the pertinent issues 'with-
out fear of retaliatory dismissal.'" Id. (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72).
144 Anderson, 554 F. Supp. at 607-08.
145 Id. at 608 (quoting Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317
(1980); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
146 641 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing the constitutionality of requirement
that groups desiring to exercise first amendment rights at airport terminal register in
advance).
147 Id. at 1247.
148 Anderson, 554 F. Supp. at 608 (quoting Fujiwara v. Clark, 477 F. Supp. 822,
833 n.32 (D. Hawaii 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 703 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1983)).
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knowing the principles applicable to a teacher's right to communicate
directly with a school board and for applying those principles to a par-
ticular factual context. For the superintendent to fulfill his responsibil-
ity, then, he would have to recognize that the channels rules constituted
an impermissible prior restraint on speech and to understand that the
law required administrative rules restricting speech "bear a 'substantial
relation' to a 'weighty governmental interest,'. .. [and] be drawn with
narrow specificity.1
149
This second approach mirrors the analysis of the Harlow concur-
rence. It assumes that the law that governs a particular defendant's
actions, even if that law is ambiguous, nevertheless includes certain
knowable principles, and it assumes that a defendant can be held re-
sponsible for applying these principles to a given factual context.1 50
The approach also allows for differences among defendants regarding
their actual knowledge of applicable law. Thus, while a purely objec-
tive analysis of case law might reveal some ambiguity in the law that
could excuse a "reasonable" public official from liability, the second
approach also allows a court to hold particular defendants accountable
for specialized legal knowledge that they actually possessed on the basis
of an "objective" canvass of the applicable law. 1
While the first approach to Harlow's qualified immunity test, ex-
emplified by Calloway, advances the policy of protecting public offi-
cials, it is so rigid that it threatens the viability of the section 1983
action as a means of protecting civil rights. 52 The second approach,
however, provides a reasonable accomodation of the opposing policies.
Courts may strictly adhere to the Harlow mandate to protect public
officials by finding that the applicable law, even when broadly con-
strued, was simply too ambiguous for a court to hold a reasonable offi-
cial responsible for applying it in a particular factual context. A court
retains the discretion, given the wide range of law that can be charac-
terized as ambiguous, to cut off insubstantial or frivolous claims at the
earliest stage of the litigation. Yet, the approach is flexible enough to
enable courts to hold public officials responsible not only for applying
149 Anderson, 554 F. Supp. at 608 (quoting Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1246).
150 See Freed, supra note 65, at 526, 558-59.
151 Cf Harlow, 457 U.S. at 820-21 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Harlow con-
currence interpreted the majority opinion as allowing, in certain cases, a factual inquiry
into a defendant's subjective state of mind. Such an inquiry would entail extensive dis-
covery, which the majority resolutely attempted to preclude. Nevertheless, Justice Bren-
nan noted, the majority standard could not be interpreted to "allow the official who
actually knows that he was violating the law to escape liability for his actions." Id. at
821.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 135-38.
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"clearly established" law in situations that closely resemble the factual
context of relevant precedent, but also for knowing general legal princi-
ples and applying them in circumstances similar to those described in
established case law. This approach requires a public official to exer-
cise legal judgment before she acts, but such a demand is surely not
unreasonable given the self-evident desirability of having public offi-
cials carefully consider the legal implications of their actions.
153
This more flexible approach aids courts that strive to minimize
litigation pressure on defendant-officials; it halts insubstantial section
1983 suits at the pre-discovery stage, in accordance with the Harlow
mandate. At the same time, the approach allows courts to preserve the
section 1983 cause of action as a vehicle for protecting and expanding
federal constitutional rights.
C. The Third Approach: Anticipation of Legal Developments
The third approach that has been taken by lower federal courts
requires that defendants anticipate and act in accordance with discern-
able trends in the law. An example of a court employing this approach
is provided by Forsyth v. Kleindienst. 154 Forsyth involved claims arising
out of the interception, by a warrantless wiretap, of the plaintiff's.tele-
phone conversations with a third party.1 55 The defendants, former
United States Attorney General John Mitchell and two FBI agents,
moved for summary judgment on the basis of the immunity defense. 56
After considering the applicable case law at the time that Mitchell had
approved the wiretaps, the district court decided that Mitchell was not
entitled to qualified immunity and denied summary judgement.1
57
The court found158 that the plaintiff's rights had been clearly es-
1"' See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 ("Where an official could be expected to know
that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made
to hesitate .... "). Holding officials responsible for knowing the law and for acting
upon their knowledge does not necessarily lead to increased litigation; it may, in fact,
lead to a reduction because of increased compliance with the law.
15 551 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
'11 The third party, Professor William Davidon, was the target of the tap. Elec-
tronic surveillance of Davidon's telephone conversations was maintained from Decem-
ber 1970 through January 1971. Three conversations involving Forsyth were inter-
cepted and recorded by government agents in December 1970. Id. at 1249.
156 Id. at 1249-50. Mitchell claimed absolute immunity, a claim the court denied
because it determined that his actions were not "so closely connected or essential to a
criminal prosecution to bring him within the 'quasi-judicial immunity' discussed in
Imbler [v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976)] and Butz [v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
509-17 (1978)]." Forsyth, 551 F. Supp. of 1251. The court went on to consider Mitch-
ell's eligibility for qualified immunity. Id. at 1253-61.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1255-59.
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tablished by Katz v. United States,159 as subsequently explicated by
United States v. United States District Court ["Keith"],160 and by Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,161 the
applicable statute governing wiretapping. Although Keith was decided
by the Supreme Court two years after the wiretap at issue in Forsyth
was installed, the Forsyth court noted that Keith represented "no break
with the past but rather [was] a logical application of the existing
law. 1 162 Thus, the court found, the principles enunciated in Keith had
been previously established and were knowable at the time that For-
syth's conversations were intercepted. 6
Mitchell argued that the law governing his actions was not
"clearly established" because some sections of Title III "counter-
manded" its "overall proscription of warrantless wiretapping." 1" The
court did not find this argument persuasive. In its view any ambiguities
in Title III increased, rather than foreclosed, Mitchell's responsibility
to act cautiously. "At the very least," the court stated, Mitchell should
have "entertained serious doubts" about his reading of the statute and
thus about the legality of the wiretap. 6 5
Forsyth ostensibly based its analysis of the defendant's qualified
immunity claim on the Harlow test. The court extensively cited Justice
Powell's majority opinion, which it acknowledged "enunciate[d] a test
for the qualified immunity of government officials that may be viewed
as more favorable to the defendant."166 Yet, its analysis, based upon a
view that a defendant must foresee whether the illegality of her action
was foreshadowed by existing law and upon a conception that statutory
ambiguities enhance susceptibility to liability; yields a result contrary to
the one Powell intended.
16 7
150 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding warrant required where there is reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy).
160 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (holding electronic surveillance conducted for national
security purposes subject to fourth amendment warrant requirements where the govern-
ment seeks to institute surveillance of a United States citizen).
161 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982) (proscribing warrantless wiretaps, effective
June 19, 1968).
162 Forsyth, 551 F. Supp. at 1255.
1 Keith's consistency with previously established law was underscored by the fact
that, in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S.
912 (1981), the D.C. Circuit applied Keith retroactively. The court noted, "We believe
that [Keith and earlier cases] ... did not announce a new principle of law, but simply
applied the constitutional warrant requirement to national security situations. As a re-
sult, we cannot say thai the outcome in those cases was not clearly foreshadowed."
Zweibon, 606 F.2d at 1179.
164 Forsyth, 551 F. Supp. at 1258.
166 Id.
166 Id. at 1253.
167 See supra text accompanying notes 86-92.
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Because the defendant, Mitchell, was in a unique position "rea-
sonably to know the law," Forsyth may represent an approach applica-
ble only to defendants in comparable positions.168 Mitchell's unique
knowledge of the current state of applicable law, in fact, figured impor-
tantly in the court's decision."' 9
If the approach were more generally applied, however, it would
create an extremely strict standard favoring section 1983 plaintiffs but
would do so at the expense of creating an intolerable disincentive to
vigorous decisionmaking by burdening public officials with a duty to
anticipate developments in constitutional law."'
Rather than carving out a third approach to post-Harlow qualified
immunity analysis, cases like Forsyth should therefore be viewed as an
application of the second approach described above. Thus Mitchell may
be seen as exemplifying the defendant who had actual knowledge of the
law and who was therefore particularly able to know and apply general
legal principles to specific factual situations. In this view Mitchell, like
any other public official, can be held responsible for knowing, applying,
and following the law pertinent to his position."'
CONCLUSION
The primary aim of immunity doctrine is to permit public officials
to carry out their tasks without the hesitation caused by fear of poten-
tial liability. Protection of the public official is regarded as furthering
" That result conflicts with the qualified immunity policy of affording particular
protection to officials in relatively sensitive, discretionary, and higher-ranking positions.
See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807; Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974); see also
Schuck, supra note 6, at 321. It does, however, coincide with concerns that officials in
such positions are especially able to abuse their positions. See supra text accompanying
notes 76-77.
l As the court noted, Mitchell's official capacity entailed a duty to know the law.
Forsyth, 551 F. Supp. at 1258. Given this duty, the court characterized Mitchell's ac-
tions as a "gamble" that Justice White's concurring opinion in Katz, which advocated
warrantless searches for national security purposes, would ultimately prevail. Id. at
1256 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 363 (White, J., concurring)). The likelihood that the
gamble would fail, however, should have been apparent to the Justice Department at
the very time of the Forsyth wiretap in light of developments leading up to the district
court's decision in Keith. That decision was based upon a determination of whether
electronic surveillance evidence was unconstitutionally tainted. The motion initiating
the decision "was filed . . . more than one month prior to the Attorney General's
authorization of the wiretap at issue" in Forsyth. 551 F. Supp. at 1255; cf. Hixon v.
Durbin, 560 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding Acting Attorney General and
General Counsel of Pennsylvania entitled to qualified immunity for not renewing an
employment contract because state statute authorizing the position in question had
never before been construed by state courts).
1 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
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the public good by facilitating efficient and effective government
through unhampered decisionmaking. This policy, however, can con-
flict with the need to restrain public officials from abusing their posi-
tions in violation of the law. The theoretical point of accomodation be-
tween these conflicting needs is qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity is designed to balance the competing policies
by looking to the good faith of the official whose actions are in ques-
tion. The content of this good faith determines the balance reached be-
tween the competing values furthered by immunity on the one hand or
liability under section 1983 on the other.
As this Comment has noted, the Supreme Court has long struggled
to define the standard by which lower courts should test an official's
good faith so as to ensure the appropriate balance between the compet-
ing policies. The Court intended, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,172 to correct
the perceived imbalance in favor of plaintiffs that a majority of the
Court believed had resulted from previous qualified immunity analysis.
As demonstrated by an examination of the ways in which lower courts
may interpret Harlow, however, the case has the potential, if miscon-
strued, to effect a new, and equally objectionable, imbalance in favor of
defendants and thereby to constrict the significance of section 1983. Im-
proper constructions of Harlow might cause section 1983 to be vitiated
as a force for deterring official wrongdoing, to be diminished as a vehi-
cle for compensating victims, or to be contracted as a mechanism for
extending federal constitutional rights.
Loss of section 1983's deterrent effect may result because use of a
narrowly construed "objective" standard presents the possibility that
public officials will engage in unpunished abuse of office by operating
in gray areas of the law."" Loss of section 1983's reparational effect
may result because use of the objective standard can be highly favorable
to defendants if courts regularly require a strict factual correspondence
between cases establishing law and the cases under consideration. This
creates the risk that potentially substantial suits may be sifted out along
with frivolous ones, a threat exacerbated by Harlow's mandate that the
objective inquiry precede discovery. Finally, the loss of section 1983's
development potential may result because use of an unduly restrictive
objective standard can stultify the exploration of new causes of action
under the section.
This Comment has advocated that the lower courts adopt a flexi-
172 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
1'7 Thus, in Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 551 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D. Pa. 1983), the court
condemned defendant Mitchell precisely because he had attempted to gamble on the
future development of the law. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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ble approach to the interpretation of Harlow; only such an approach
yields the appropriate accomodation between the competing policies. An
objective determination of applicable law should encompass general
principles of law which an objectively reasonable official may be held
responsible for knowing and applying. While this approach follows the
Harlow concurrence in requiring that a defendant's good faith be mea-
sured within the factual context of particular cases, it nevertheless es-
chews the suggestion of the concurring Justices that a subjective in-
quiry into an official's actual knowledge may be necessary. The second
approach thus remains faithful to the mandate of the Harlow majority
that good faith be measured on a purely objective standard, without
sacrificing the policies embodied in the right of action provided by sec-
tion 1983.

The editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review are
delighted to dedicate this issue to John 0. Honnold, the William A.
Schnader Professor of Commercial Law. Professor Honnold has served
as a teacher and scholar at the University of Pennsylvania for almost
forty years. The tributes that follow attest to his warm, generous spirit
and the broad scope of his interests, expertise, and influence, particu-
larly in the unification of international commercial law. The Law Re-
view wishes Professor Honnold well as he continues his work both at
the Law School and beyond.
